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vs. 
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REPLY BRIEF OF 
APPELLANT DAVID S. GROW 
Case No. 16675 
A statement of the nature of this case, its disposition 
in the district court, the relief Appellant seeks on appeal and 
a statement of facts, are all set forth in Appellant's Brief 
on file herein. This Reply Brief is submitted for the purpose 
of answering the matters raised in Respondents' Brief and reiter-
ating the arguments which compel a reversal of the Summary Judgment. 
The short-forms used herein have the meaings set forth in Appellant's 
Brief. 
POINT I 
APPENDIX "A" OF RESPONDENTS' BRIEF IS NOT PART OF THE 
~ORD ON APPEAL AND CANNOT BE CONSIDERED BY THE COURT. 
Pursuant to Rule 75(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Appellant designated the entire record made in the lower court 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to be included in the record on appeal herein. (R. 235_ 86 .) 
Respondents have at no time objected to the completeness of 
the record. Nor did they comp lain in the lower court about the ' 
adequacy or accuracy of the record. 
that: 
Rule 75(h), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides 
If anything material to either party is omitted 
£:-om the record on appeal by error or accident or is 
misstated therein, the parties by stipulation or 
the district court, either before or after th~ record , 
is transmitted to the Supreme Court, or the Supreme 
Court, on a proper suggestion or of its own initiative 
may direct that the omission or misstatement shall ' 
be corrected, and if necessary that a supplemental 
record shall be certified and transmitted by the clerk 
of the district court. 
Although Respondents have made no attempt to follow the required 
procedures set forth in Rule 7 5 (h) , they seek now to supplement 
the record on appeal with a preliminary title report which was 
neither included nor even referred to in the record proper and 
which has not been certified as part of the record on appeal. 
The document is not authenticated, is inadmissablible hearsay, ar: 
is presented in a way that affords no opportunity to test its 
accuracy or completeness. 
It is clear that Respondents' submission to the Court 
of documents not contained in the record on appeal is improper, 
notwithstanding their attempt to cloak such impropriety with the 
" d h d · 1 · "Boardwalk does not wish to label "Appendix an t e isc aimer: 
supplement the record on appeal." 
Tucker Realty, Inc. v. Nunley, 16 
(Respondents' Brief, p.8.) Jn 
U.2d 97, 396 P.2d 410 (1 964),a 
. h transcript. 
1 t th record on appeal wit a party sought to supp emen e 
-2-
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of testimony received after the appeal had been taken. The trans-
cript was simply brought and left with the clerk of the Supreme 
' court. In ruling that the transcript could not be considered by 
the court in resolving the matter on appeal, the Supreme Court 
referred to Rule 7 5 (h) and explained as follows: 
No order has been made authorizing this trans-
cript ~o be made part of the record on appeal. Nor 
could it properly have been. The appeal is from 
and is limited to the proceedings in the district 
court upon which the judgment is based. The rule 
referred to contemplates that any addition to the 
record be part of that proceeding, and does not 
authorize bringing in anything other than that 
record. It requires but a moment's reflection to 
realize what a chaotic situation would exist if 
after a judgment is entered and an appeal taken, 
the parties could keep on having supplemental 
proceedings, adducing new evidence, and forwarding 
the transcripts to the Supreme Court. The illogic 
and irregularity of attempting to do so is so 
obvious that further comment as to its impropriety 
is unnecessary. 
Id. at 413-14 (footnotes omitted). 
In Nelson v. State Tax Commission, 506 P.2d 473 (Utah 
1973), the Supreme Court again had occasion to rule upon the 
propriety of submitting new documentary evidence on appeal. The 
appellant in that case had obtained a stipulation from respondent 
that certain documentary evidence could be included in the record 
on appeal, even though it had not been introduced or made part of 
the record in the lower court proceedings. The Supreme Court 
cited Tucker Realty in holding that: 
[T]here is no indication whatsoever that [the 
document] is or was part of the record. We therefore 
cannot properly so regard it any more than we coul~ 
any other extraneous document which someone may bring 
in and lodge with this court. 
!!!_. at 440. 
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The irregularity and impropriety of Respondents' back. 
handed attempt to circumvent both Rule 7 5 (h) and the holdings of 
Tucker Realty and Nelson is so obvi'ous h f 
- t at urther comment , as to 
its impropriety is unnecessary. Consequently, Appendix "A" to 
Respondents' Brief and all references in Respondents' Brief to 
said Appendix "A" are beyond the record on appeal and hence 
beyond consideration or entertainment by the Court. 
POINT II 
THE DEFAULT WAS NOT TIMELY CURED AND FORFEITURE IS 
THE BARGAINED-FOR REMEDY. 
Respondents contend that Buyers tendered to Appellant 
all delinquent sums under the Contract within fifteen (15) days 
after receiving the August 9, 1978 Notice of Default. Neverthele; 
Respondents have admitted that, if Paragraph llB applied to "all 
amounts unpaid" under the Contract (whether or not currently due), 
there has never been a sufficient tender of payment to cure the 1 
existing defaults. (R. 82, 83.) Thus, the question of whether 
the default was cured depends upon resolution of questions con· 
cerning the interpretation of Paragraph llB. To argue that the 
admitted defaults were timely cured is merely to beg the question. 
And if the default was not timely cured, forfeiture certainly 
is one of the bargained-for remedies set forth in the Contract. 
POINT III 
THE REMEDY OF BARGAINED-FOR FORFEITURE IS REASONABJ! 
AND PROPER. 
J dgmen1 
Respondents' Brief and the trial court's Sunnnary u ·, 
entirely misapprehend the law with respect to enforcement of the ' 
-4-
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forfeiture remedy in Uniform Real Estate Contracts. Utah courts 
have consistently held that forfeitures of land based upon this 
or similar provisions of the Uniform Real Estate Contract are 
generally enforceable. It is critical, however, to distinguish 
between those "forfeiture" provisions governing the release of 
' the vendor from all obligations to convey the subject property 
and those "forfeiture" provisions resulting in a loss of all 
payments made or liquidated damages. The Utah courts have developed 
various principles and policies to ameliorate the sometimes harsh 
effects of enforcing liquidated damages provisions. But the 
same courts have, except in very limited circumstances, consis-
tently enforced the vendor's right to be released from any obliga-
tion to convey the subject property to the defaulting vendee. 
Cases illustrating this distinction are collected under 
Point III of Appellant's Brief on file herein. These cases 
1 
demonstrate that the customary and most equitable course of 
action is to release the vendor from any obligation to convey the 
subject property but to award the vendee some measure of restitu-
tion where necessary to avoid a "penalty." 
Respondents' Brief and the trial court's Summary Judgment 
both fail to acknowledge these two very different facets of the 
forfeiture provision. Consequently, Respondents' assertion of 
"windfall to Grow in excess of $200, 000. 00" (Respondents' Brief, 
p. 16) is grossly overstated. The record is entirely silent as 
to the market value of the property. Respondents' effort to argue 
its case based upon unsupported and extravagant claims of market 
1 
value and "windfall" are improper and illustrate vividly the 
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the defect in the judgment below. The Surmnary Judgment must be 
reversed and the case remanded to h t e trial court for a d t e er. 
mination first of Appellant's right to be released fro 
m any 
obligation to convey the property and second of Respondents' 
right, if any, to restitution. 
As to the favor with which forfeiture provisions gen-
erally are held in the law, it must be remembered that we are 
dealing here with transactions in non-residential property amoni 
sophisticated businessmen, not novices or uninformed consumer 
victims. Thus, the express remedial provisions of the parties' 
bargained-for agreement should not be lightly ignored or comproo: 
In Peck v. Judd, 7 Utah 2d 420, 326 P. 2d 712, 717 
(1958), the Utah Supreme Court correctly explained the nature a.1: 
scope of its function in resolving disputes arising under unifor: 
real estate contracts: 
It is not our in and rene o· 
tiate t e contract o t e parties. t may e conce ed 
that with an advantaged background we may be able to 
improve on their work and considering the changed ~ime: 
and conditions say what now appears to us to be fair 
under such conditions. Possibly at least one of the 
parties would agree. There is no reason why we shoulc 
consider the vendee privileged and entitled to o~r . 
intervention unless the conditions sought to be imposec 
on the vendee are unconscionable. Equity should n~t 
indulge in refinements and exact valuations at a time 
subsequent to breach of recission. Further than ~o 
determine if enforcement of the contract results 10 ld 
grown inequity, and unless and until enfor7ement wou . 
be highly unconscionable, we should recognize and, ~ono. 
the right of persons to contract fr7ely and to, mf~n th 
real and genuine mistakes when dealing at arms g 
(Emphasis Added.) 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF PARAGRAPH ll_!E 1 
ERRONEOUS AND IMPROPER. 
-6-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
It is true that 11 [a] 11 parties submitted to the Court 
that the language of the Contract [i.e. , Paragraph llB] was clear 
and unequivocal. 11 (Respondents' Brief, p .16.) What Respondents 
failed to disclose, however, is that each party considered the 
Paragraph llB language to have a clear and unequivocal meaning 
directly conflicting with the clear and unequivocal meaning 
attached to such language by the opposing party. 
The parties have from the outset of litigation argued 
explicitly about the interpretation of Paragraph llB. Buyers' 
Answer to Appellant's Complaint states that "ll(b) is ambiguous 
and is subject to varying interpretations." (R. 34.) In the 
hearing on Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment, counsel for 
Boardwalk and Phoenix asserted that Paragraph llB is "very clear 
in its meaning, 11 and then explained: 
We think it is clear that the words "on all 
amounts unpaid" relate directly back to the words 
"delinquent or in default" and that has to be 
the clear intent of that provision and the clear 
meaning of that language. 
(R. 326-327.) Counsel for Appellant argued contrariwise that: 
It is clear that the 18 percent interest applied 
to all unpaid amounts. It does not say "all amounts 
presently due and owing." It does not say "any 
delinquent amounts." It says "all unpaid amounts 
under the contract." If I may draw [an] analogy, 
that is connnon language in a promissory note that 
interest is payable on all unpaid amounts. That 
language is not construed to mean the amount that 
is due that particular month, but all unpaid amounts 
on the promissory note. It is clear that the l~ 
percent interest applied to all amounts both pr~n­
cipal and interest anytime after default or delin-
quency. 
(R. 330.) The foregoing references evidence the very dive:i<se 
meanings of Paragraph llB advanced by counsel for the parties 
during litigation. 
-7-
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In making his Ruling and Judgment in the trial court, 
Judge Sam did not state that the meaning of Paragraph llB is 
clear and unequivocal on its face. Indeed, the language of the 
Ruling seems to indicate the contrary, i.e. , that Paragraph llB 
was ambiguous, thus requiring "interpretation." Appellant submit 
that the language of Paragraph llB means what all of the evidenci 
in the record says it means, or that it is at least ambiguous, 
creating a material issue of fact which cannot be disposed of by 
sunnnary judgment. (See Appellant's Brief, P.10-18.) 
The evidence in the record, when viewed in the light 
most favorable to Appellant, supports Appellant's construction of 
Paragraph llB. The testimony of David Grow and Stephen Thomas 
shows that Appellant's interpretation was the one agreed upon 
between Appellant and Buyers at the time the Contract was entereo 
into. Again, Respondents' argument that these affidavits are 
not admissible in evidence simply begs the question. Extrinsic 
or parol evidence is certainly admissible to resolve ambiguous 
contract language. 
Ambiguity exists because reasonable minds may differ 
as to the meaning of Paragraph llB. Camp v. Deseret Mutual 
Benefit Association, 589 P. 2d 780 (Utah 1979). Since ambiguity 
1 
I 
is a question of law, an appellate court is in the same position ' 
as a trial court to determine the existence of an ambiguity· 
Kan. 665, 518 P.2d 539 (1 974)~ See, ~· Craig v. Hamilton, 213 
2 Wash.App. 594, 469 p .2d 233 Beedle v. General Investment Co., 
(1970). · 1 determ.;ned there was no Insofar as the tria court ~ 
Court to hold as a matter ambiguity, Appellant urges the Supreme 
-8-
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of law that Paragraph llB is ambiguous and that the existence 
of factual issues regarding its interpretation precluded summary 
judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in granting the Summary Judgment. 
Respondents have failed to revute Appellant's argument that, if 
the material facts concerning the interpretation of Paragraph llB 
are resolved in favor of Appellant, Respondents did not timely 
cure their admitted default and delinquency. Forfeiture of the 
subject property is the remedy bargained for between the parties 
and is reasonable and proper under the circumstances. The Court 
should not rewrite the Contract or void its express provisions. 
At worst, Paragraph llB is ambiguous as a matter of law, and 
the existence of factual issues surrounding such ambiguity preclude 
the Summary Judgment. 
Summary Judgment should therefore be reversed and the 
case remanded to the trial court for a trial on the factual 
issues as to the parties' intended meaning of Paragraph llB and 
other remaining issues. 
Respectfully submitted this 5th day of September 1980. 
... 
MARTINEAU, ROOKER, LARSEN & KIMBALL 
By ~A,-/)/);...____ 
1800 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
David S. Grow 
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